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INTRODUCTION 
 
  From the dawn of broadcasting until the late 1980s, the federal government 
vigorously employed substantive media regulations – legal guidelines about the substance 
of programming – to try to ensure that the broadcast industry would serve the public 
interest.2  The most familiar element of substantive broadcast regulation, and the term 
that has become shorthand for the entire effort, was the FCC’s fairness doctrine.  That 
doctrine required television and radio broadcasters, first, to devote a reasonable 
percentage of airtime to covering issues of public importance and, second, to provide a 
reasonable opportunity for the expression of opposing views on those issues.3  
Substantive broadcast regulation also included FCC requirements that broadcasters offer 
reply time to any entity whose “honesty, character, or integrity” was attacked on the air in 
connection with a controversial issue of public importance4 and to any political candidate 
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helpful and challenging comments on an earlier version of this article, presented at the symposium Access 
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 The scope of “substantive media regulation” as discussed in this article does not extend to regulations 
aimed at “obscene” or “indecent” programming, which arguably carry more force than ever today and raise 
their own distinctive and formidable problems.  See generally FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 
(1978) (upholding FCC’s authority to restrict “indecent” programming). 
3
 The FCC formally imposed these two obligations in Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 
F.C.C. 1246 (1949), and reiterated them in FCC, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 
Fairness Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26375 (1974).  The fairness doctrine’s 
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antecedent of the doctrine was the Commission’s short-lived ban on broadcast editorializing, announced in 
Mayflower Broad. Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). 
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whose opponent a broadcast editorial endorsed.5  In addition, Congress required 
broadcasters to give political candidates reasonable opportunities to purchase air time6 
and to extend opposing candidates the same access to free or purchased time.7  The 
Supreme Court upheld the candidate access rules against a First Amendment challenge,8 
and they remain in effect.  The FCC, however, has scrapped the fairness doctrine9 and the 
personal attack and political editorial rules,10 despite the Court’s having rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to those regulations in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.11 
 The FCC’s abandonment of the fairness doctrine resulted from a confluence of 
several currents in law and public policy.  Legislators and regulators in the late Cold War 
period became fixated on the idea that the economic marketplace could solve every 
problem without interference from the heavy hand of government.12  Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court – just five years after, and in sharp contrast to, its Red Lion decision – 
struck down a personal attack reply requirement for newspapers in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.13  The Court’s turn against substantive media regulation 
reflects a free speech orthodoxy that crystallized in the 1970s and still prevails today, 
under which the First Amendment simply protects whatever distribution of expressive 
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 See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).  The F.C.C. declared in Syracuse Peace Council 
that the fairness doctrine violated the First Amendment.  The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission’s 
decision without reaching the constitutional issue, deferring to the Commission’s alternative conclusion 
that the doctrine did not serve the public interest.  See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
10
 The D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to abolish the personal attack and political editorial rules because the 
Commission had adopted those rules in conjunction with the fairness doctrine but had failed to rule on 
requests to reconsider them after it disavowed the fairness doctrine.  See Radio-Television News Directors 
Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
11
 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
12
 See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 58-60 (1996) (describing deregulatory movement that 
began in late 1960s and its effect on media regulation). 
13
 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 3 
opportunities the economic market happens to produce.14  That orthodoxy renders 
incoherent – even improper – any suggestion that constitutional expressive freedom 
should serve some instrumental conception of just distribution or effective public debate.  
As regulators and the Court have subordinated public policy and constitutional doctrine 
to the market, substantive media regulation has largely receded into antiquity.  Few 
voices in the past two decades have spoken well of the fairness doctrine. 
 A few commentators, however, have continued to defend the idea of substantive 
media regulation against the dominant legal and political currents.  Jerome Barron has led 
the effort.  In Barron’s conception, the First Amendment is not a lock that safeguards the 
market-derived expressive prerogatives of powerful media corporations.  Rather, the 
Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and a free press form a key, designed to open 
public debate to the diverse range of participants and ideas necessary for our democratic 
system to flourish.  Barron’s pioneering writings on First Amendment access rights mark 
the pinnacle of this First Amendment vision.15  In the ensuing decades, while engaging 
nuance and eschewing partisanship, Barron has continued to chart pathways toward 
enhanced media access and has relentlessly critiqued the Court’s and regulators’ retreat 
from the Red Lion decision’s tentative steps toward access rights.16  From the beginning, 
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 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1946-59 (2003) (discussing ascendancy of private rights theory of expressive 
freedom) (hereinafter Magarian, Political Parties). 
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 See JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA 
(1973) (hereinafter BARRON, FREEDOM); Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access 
to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1968) (hereinafter Barron, Emerging Right); Jerome A. 
Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967) (hereinafter 
Barron, New Right). 
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 See JEROME A. BARRON, PUBLIC RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE PRESS (1981) (hereinafter BARRON, PUBLIC 
RIGHTS); Jerome A. Barron, Rights of Access and Reply to the Media in the United States Today, 25 COMM. 
& L. 1 (2003) (hereinafter Barron, Access Today); Jerome A. Barron, Structural Regulation of the Media 
and the Diversity Rationale, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 555 (2000); Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and 
the Flight from First Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 817 (1998); Jerome A. Barron, Reading Turner Through a Tornillo Lens, COMM. LAWYER 
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Barron understood the limits of the fairness doctrine better than most libertarian critics, 
stressing the clumsiness of administrative enforcement and the need to root access 
principles not merely in political discretion but in a positive constitutional vision.17  
Nonetheless, he has consistently defended those regulations as useful paving stones on 
the road to fulsome access rights, while offering incisive proposals to refine substantive 
media regulation. 
 The country may be starting to catch up with Barron.  Since the Democrats took 
over Congress this year, calls to revive the fairness doctrine have grown louder.18  Those 
calls, however, have often resonated only faintly with Barron’s principled case for 
substantive media regulation as a component of access rights.  Democrats and liberals, in 
advocating a fairness doctrine revival, routinely target conservative talk radio’s one-sided 
attacks on Democrats and liberals.19  The transparency of their self-interest has allowed 
Republicans and conservatives to conflate their own self-interest with libertarian free 
speech pieties in warning that renewed regulation would lay waste not merely to 
broadcasting but to the First Amendment.20  The arguments on both sides lack much 
substance, obscure most nuance, and have nothing to do with the rigorous striving to 
understand how expressive freedom can best advance democratic values that Barron’s 
work exemplifies.  Meanwhile, the Internet has changed the mass communications 
landscape in ways both profound and elusive.  By giving an unprecedented number and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Summer, 1995), at [page];  Jerome A. Barron, What Does the Fairness Doctrine Controversy Really 
Mean?, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 205 (1989) (hereinafter Barron, Controversy). 
17
 See BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 150-59 (discussing defects of fairness doctrine in light of 
access principle). 
18
 See Jim Puzzanghera, Democrats Speak Out for Fairness Doctrine, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2007), at C1. 
19
 See id. (describing criticisms of conservative talk radio by advocates of a fairness doctrine revival). 
20
 See, e.g., George F. Will, Why Howard Dean Wants to Re-regulate the Media, NEWSWEEK (May 7, 
2007), at [page].  Republicans in the House recently succeeded in passing a bill that would block the F.C.C. 
from reinstating the fairness doctrine, but Senate Democrats scuttled a similar measure.  See Puzzanghera, 
supra note 18.  
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variety of speakers a public platform, online communication has dramatically increased 
the variety of perspectives available in public discourse; at the same time, it has created 
unprecedented opportunities to narrow the range of viewpoints one encounters.   
Supporters of a renewed fairness doctrine tend to ignore the impact of the Internet, while 
opponents reflexively extol cyberspace as the harbinger of an unregulated world. 
 This article attempts to transcend the partisan divide and engage the debate over 
substantive media regulation in a manner that honors Barron’s thoughtful example.  It 
seeks to impose order on, and develop some insights from, arguments for and against 
substantive media regulation that allow for some government role in making the mass 
media more broadly accessible and more informative about matters of public concern.  
Elsewhere I have critiqued the libertarian position that the First Amendment absolutely 
bars any judicial or regulatory effort to broaden media access.21  Accordingly, I set that 
position aside here, and with it much conventional First Amendment doctrine.22  Instead I 
consider arguments that, without necessarily foreclosing the theoretical basis of Barron’s 
case for access rights, nonetheless oppose substantive media regulation as some 
combination of practically unworkable; undesirable when compared with policy 
alternatives such as subsidy programs and structural regulations of media ownership; and 
distinctively, intractably offensive even to a conception of the First Amendment that 
permits some form of access initiative.  These objections depend on descriptive accounts 
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 See Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdom of First 
Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373, 1388-1405 (2007) (describing and critiquing 
libertarian attacks on proposals for expressive access rights) (hereinafter Magarian, Access Rights). 
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thinking”); but see C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and 
Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 93-114 (contending that conventional First Amendment doctrine generally 
permits nonsuppressive, content-based regulation to structure media entities) (hereinafter Baker, Content-
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 6 
of substantive media regulations and their consequences that differ fundamentally from 
the accounts offered by supporters. 
 Disagreements about the constitutionality and wisdom of substantive media 
regulation – aired most forcefully between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, when policy 
debate over the fairness doctrine achieved its greatest urgency – break down into three 
separate descriptive dimensions.  The first part of this article explains how supporters and 
opponents of substantive media regulation have viewed each of those dimensions.  The 
first dimension concerns whose interest substantive media regulation serves.  Supporters 
of substantive regulation invoke the will and interests of the political community as a 
whole.  Opponents, in contrast, claim that substantive regulation reflects the will and 
interests only of governing elites and powerful interest groups.  The second dimension 
concerns which actors substantive regulation constrains.  Supporters characterize 
substantive regulation as targeting and constraining the excessive power of media owners 
and advertisers.  Opponents counter that substantive regulation undermines the 
journalistic discretion of editors and reporters.  The final dimension – the most complex 
of the three – concerns regulatory goals for affecting the media landscape.  Supporters 
posit that substantive regulation seeks to invigorate discussion of important public issues 
while ensuring some measure of diversity in the voices and viewpoints expressed in the 
mass media.  Opponents indict substantive regulation as directed toward the impossible 
goal of perfect balance in an incoherently limited subset of the mass media.  If the 
supporters’ descriptions of these three dimensions are right, then substantive media 
regulations are most likely both constitutional, under a First Amendment theory that 
allows for government access initiatives, and wise.  If the opponents’ descriptions are 
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right, then substantive regulations are most likely unconstitutional, even under such a 
hospitable First Amendment theory, and unwise. 
 In each of the three dimensions, I find some merit in both sides’ descriptive 
arguments.  The second part of this article offers some tentative suggestions about how a 
revival of substantive media regulation might strive to maximize the characteristics 
emphasized by supporters while minimizing those emphasized by opponents.  As to the 
first dimension – whose interests does substantive regulation serve? – a renewed fairness 
doctrine should entail greater interaction among Congress, courts, and the FCC while 
incorporating rules to discourage government actors from manipulating enforcement.  As 
to the second dimension – whom does substantive regulation constrain? – Congress and 
the FCC should create and enforce rules that would fortify journalistic ethical norms of 
public service against interference by media owners and advertisers.  The third and final 
dimension – how does substantive regulation aim to alter the prevailing media landscape? 
– presents major problems for any effort to revive substantive media regulation, given the 
conceptual complexity of fairness regulations and the number, variety, and rapidly 
evolving technological platforms of contemporary information sources.  My tentative 
suggestion for addressing those problems is that any restoration of the fairness doctrine 
should aim to ensure that what I term the conventional mass media will provide 
substantial exposure for debate about issues of public concern.  Such an effort could 
usefully furnish at least a near-term republican counterweight to the pluralizing dynamics 
of the Internet.  
 
I. THREE DIMENSIONS OF DISPUTE 
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 In implementing substantive media regulation, the FCC made loud but often hazy 
representations about what the fairness doctrine required, and its appetite for enforcement 
oscillated unpredictably.  Broadcasters confronted the doctrine with a mixture of 
combativeness and accommodation.  Courts, academics, and the public expressed shifting 
views about the mass media’s shortcomings and how effectively the doctrine addressed 
them.  Out of this complex dynamic, the debate over the constitutionality and efficacy of 
substantive media regulation resolved into three distinct dimensions: Whose interests 
does regulation serve?  Whose autonomy does regulation constrain?  How does 
regulation aim to alter the prevailing media landscape?  The fairness doctrine’s advocates 
and opponents held fundamentally divergent views about each of those three dimensions.  
Even people who agree (or concede for the sake of argument) that democracy requires 
rich and diverse media, that media markets fall short of producing the media democracy 
requires, and that government therefore should seek ways to improve the media’s 
performance nonetheless disagree sharply about whether or not substantive regulation can 
make a positive difference.  Debate over reviving the fairness doctrine must begin with 
an understanding of that disagreement and the divergent observations behind it. 
   
A. Whose Interests Does Substantive Regulation Serve?  
  1. Thesis: The Political Community 
The fairness doctrine reflects a free speech tradition, substantially divergent from 
present First Amendment orthodoxy, that I have labeled the public rights theory of 
expressive freedom.23  Professor Barron’s media access principle forms a cornerstone of 
that tradition and provides a broad context for understanding the fairness doctrine.  
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 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note 14, at 1972-91 (describing public rights theory). 
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Barron began from the premise that the mass media have not only First Amendment 
rights but also First Amendment obligations to inform the public about political issues 
and to provide a forum for a diverse range of voices to participate in public discourse.24  
The mass media, however, hold sufficient power to resist providing access to the public, 
and their self-interest in avoiding “the novel and heretical” feeds their resistance.25  Not 
merely public but private suppression of ideas threatens First Amendment values.26  
Accordingly, the government properly may intervene to ensure public access to the 
media.  Indeed, Barron maintained that courts can and should enforce a right of media 
access as a positive First Amendment mandate.27  In practical terms, however, 
administering access rights in our complex media culture presents at least some problems 
better suited for regulators.  Thus, Barron embraced the fairness doctrine as a useful 
component of the access principle in action.28 
The cornerstone of the access principle, and of any defense of the fairness 
doctrine, is the public interest.29  As Barron declared, “[t]he party challenging the 
broadcaster under the Fairness Doctrine is not the state but the public.”30  The 
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 See Barron, New Right, supra note 15, at 1647-50 (conceptualizing First Amendment as providing basis 
for access rights). 
25
 Id. at 1646. 
26
 See id. at 1655-56. 
27
 See BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 155; Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 15, at 509; Barron, 
New Right, supra note 15, at 1667-69. 
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 See FISS, supra note 12, at 58 (describing fairness doctrine as intended “to make certain that the all-
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the story”); Roscoe Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in 
the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 509 (1968) (defending fairness doctrine as 
“governmental action which assures access of the public to information and ideas”); Charles D. Ferris and 
James A. Kirkland, Fairness – the Broadcaster’s Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 605, 616 
(1985) (contending that fairness doctrine “vindicate(s) the public interest in information on issues and 
candidates”); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1715-25 (1997) (justifying broadcast 
regulation in terms of public’s interest in robust democratic debate). 
30
 Barron, Controversy, supra note 16, at 244.  
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Communications Act of 1934 centrally requires broadcast licensees to operate in the 
public interest, based on the notion that the airwaves are a public resource entrusted to 
licensees.31  The FCC and supporters of the fairness doctrine portrayed the doctrine as a 
natural corollary to this conception of broadcasters as public trustees.32  Rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to the fairness doctrine in Red Lion,33 Justice White predicated his 
analysis on “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral and other ideas and experiences.”34  The public interest means more than the will 
of the majority.  If the fairness doctrine simply let the elected branches impose 
majoritarian preferences on media content, it would violate the First Amendment’s 
protection of unpopular ideas against government censorship.  “The People” whose 
interests the doctrine’s supporters invoke are not majorities who seek to drown out 
dissenting voices, but rather the political community as a whole.  The democratic impetus 
behind substantive regulation, which draws heavily on Alexander Meiklejohn’s First 
Amendment theory, is that the political community must hear a wide range of opinions, 
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 See 47 U.S.C. §151. 
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 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111-12 (1963) 
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DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 290, 292 (1990) (arguing that licensure “hook” is necessary to justify 
regulatory burden); Logan, supra note 29, at 1725-34 (justifying media regulation based on government’s 
preferential treatment of broadcast licensees); Richard D. Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First 
Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 974, 982-85 (1970) (positing the need for 
rational allocation of spectrum as the basis for broadcasters’ public interest obligations); R. Randall Rainey, 
The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: 
A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L. J. 269, 338-43 (1993) 
(discussing public interest obligations as an incident of broadcast licensure). 
33
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
34
 Id. at 390. 
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prominently including opinions that offend the majority, in order to govern itself 
effectively.35  A corollary, absent from Meiklejohn36 but prominent in Barron’s case for 
access rights, is that democracy benefits when the widest possible range of speakers 
participates in public discourse.37 
The regulatory concept of fairness was narrower, and less onerous for regulated 
media, than Barron’s ideal of access.  The fairness doctrine left ultimate responsibility for 
presenting a wide range of views on controversial issues to broadcasters,38 and even a 
more vigorous brand of enforcement than the FCC provided under the fairness doctrine 
would leave the media with significant discretion.  Access connotes an obligation to 
admit not just divergent ideas but particular divergent speakers who specifically demand 
a platform, and not just two opposing positions but the widest possible range of opinions 
that bear on important public issues.  In addition, the fairness doctrine operated in a 
reactive manner, requiring some action or willful inaction by broadcasters to trigger any 
liability; in contrast, the access principle reflects a proactive and instrumental effort to 
deepen and broaden public debate.39  Given Barron’s charge that First Amendment 
doctrine “protect[s] expression once it has come to the fore” but ignores the importance 
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 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948); see also Barron, New Right, supra 
note 15, at 1648-49. 
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 See BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 71 (“The essence of the idea of access is participation in the 
media for the authentic voice of each variety of opinion.”); Barron, New Right, supra note 15, at 1649-50 
(relating access principle to First Amendment’s function of maintaining public order by allowing political 
dissidents to express their views). 
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 See, e.g., Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that FCC 
finds violations of fairness doctrine only where broadcasters’ actions are unreasonable or in bad faith); see 
also Ferris and Kirkland, supra note 29, at 614-15 (approvingly describing deferential character of fairness 
doctrine enforcement). 
39
 See BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 150-51; Barron; Emerging Right, supra note 15, at 489-90; 
Barron, New Right, supra note 15, at 1664. 
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of “creat[ing] opportunities for expression,”40 the fairness doctrine represented only a 
limited step in the right direction.  Still, the fairness doctrine incrementally advanced the 
twin goals of the access principle: broadening the political community’s access to 
information and involving as many and varied people as possible in active discussion of 
public issues. 
Few of the fairness doctrine’s supporters – least of all Barron – were blind to the 
risk that regulators, in the media field as in any other, could abuse their power.41  Barron 
emphasized that the doctrine empowered the government only to enforce procedures to 
broaden public debate, not to introduce preferred substantive ideas into debate.42  The 
doctrine at times made a decisive difference in broadening the store of information 
available to the public and the opportunities for excluded voices to access the broadcast 
media.  Perhaps the doctrine’s signature achievement was the transformation in the 1970s 
of WLBT, an NBC television affiliate in Jackson, Mississippi.43  The station’s owners 
during the 1950s and 1960s ran it in an unabashedly racist manner.  They censored news 
reports about the civil rights movement and its leaders, editorialized rabidly against racial 
                                                 
40
  Barron, New Right, supra note 15, at 1641; but see Ferris and Kirkland, supra note 29, at 618-21 
(crediting fairness doctrine with making broadcast media not just more informative but also more 
inclusive). 
41
 See BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 64 (criticizing proposal to extend fairness doctrine to print 
media based on dangers of agency capture and political abuse); Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 15, at 
507 (acknowledging danger of executive branch’s tampering in fairness enforcement); Barron, New Right, 
supra note 15, at 1676-77 (calling on courts to articulate “bounds to a right of access which could be 
utilized cautiously, but nevertheless meaningfully”). 
42
 See BARRON, PUBLIC RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 18 (“The great appeal of the fairness principle is its 
ideological neutrality.”); Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 15, at 507 (identifying fairness doctrine as “a 
governmentally-sponsored process for stimulating the interchange of ideas” rather than a system “in which 
the government contributes substantively to the information process”); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES 
OF A FREE PRESS 110 (1991) (contrasting substantive broadcast regulations with censorship); STEVEN J. 
SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 189 (1978) (describing aim of fairness doctrine as 
broadening media access “in a general way”); Rainey, supra note 32, at 292-93 (describing fairness 
doctrine as rooted in the “right of the political community at large to seek the truth through a public 
exchange of ideas that is as free as possible from ideological manipulation”). 
43
 A rich narrative of the WLBT case appears in KAY MILLS, CHANGING CHANNELS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
CASE THAT TRANSFORMED TELEVISION (2004), from which this paragraph draws its account. 
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integration without airing any opposing views, and even refused to show black and white 
teens dancing together on the station’s music show.  A coalition led by the United Church 
of Christ challenged WLBT’s practices when its license came up for renewal by the FCC.  
The Commission timidly renewed the station’s license twice, but at both stages the D.C. 
Circuit reversed, holding that the station owners’ racist policies violated the fairness 
doctrine and failed to serve the interests of the community.44  After a long battle, a 
biracial civic group succeeded in stripping away the racist owners’ license and turned the 
station into an exemplar of evenhanded reporting and community service.  Almost every 
commentator sympathetic to the fairness doctrine understandably spotlights the WLBT 
case,45 because it exemplifies the doctrine’s role in advancing the public interest. 
  2. Antithesis: Governing Elites  
 Opponents of substantive media regulation dismissed or disdained the idea that 
substantive regulation serves a generalized public interest.  Some indicted the very 
concept of the “public interest” as a front for the interests of regulators or influential 
groups.46  Opponents viewed substantive media regulation through the lens of public 
choice theory, maintaining that regulation advanced the interests of the governing elite 
and whatever interest groups could influence relevant government institutions to the 
detriment of ordinary consumers.  “Government,” one critic asserted, “is by definition 
                                                 
44
 See United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United Church of Christ v. FCC, 
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
45
 See BOLLINGER, supra note 42, at 131; FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 89-102 (1976); Barron, New Right, 
supra note 15, at 1663-66. 
46
 See FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS – A REAPPRAISAL OF THE 
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND EQUAL TIME RULE 35-38 (1984); Mark S. Fowler and Daniel L. Brenner, A 
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210 (1982) (arguing that the FCC 
“should rely on the broadcasters’ ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal 
mechanisms of the marketplace”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine 
Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 159-60. 
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integrated with the power class of American society, and it is axiomatic that the press 
already gives greater voice to the ‘outs’ than the government does or is likely to.”47  
Thus, opponents portrayed the fairness doctrine as, at best, no more than a handy tool that 
politically powerful groups could use to attack and harass broadcasters who impeded 
their interests.48  At best, they noted, the doctrine filtered the public interest through “an 
examination and judgment by the Commission of program content.”49  At worst, the 
doctrine instantiated “a public right to hear what government regulators determine 
listeners do or should prefer.”50  No less a free speech paladin than Harry Kalven branded 
substantive regulation “government surveillance for broadcasting.”51 
 Even opponents of substantive regulation tended to acknowledge that the FCC 
enforced the fairness doctrine without overt political bias.52  Nonetheless, opponents 
emphasized that the existence of a powerful tool for influencing media content created 
the danger that regulators or elected officials might abuse the enforcement apparatus to 
advance their own ends.  The FCC may feel pressure from the top down, as the 
government exerts pressure on Commissioners to view disputes in a particular light or 
even to enforce the doctrine against disfavored media entities.  The Nixon administration 
tried to use the fairness doctrine to monitor and intimidate media outlets that it perceived 
                                                 
47
 Carl S. Stepp, Access in a Post-Social Responsibility Age, in LICHTENBERG, supra note 32, at 186, 194. 
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 See ROWAN, supra note 46, at 43; Fowler and Brenner, supra note 46, at 231; Kalven, supra note 51, at 
18-20; but see POWE, supra note 48, at 161 (asserting that FCC decisions typically favor the political party 
to which most commissioners belong); C. Edwin Baker, Misguided Fairness, 26 PENN LAW J. 12, 14 (June 
1991) (asserting that FCC’s “periodic enforcement predictably embodied a centrist and often 
progovernment conception of what ‘balance’ requires”). 
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as political enemies while scheming to strip media opponents of broadcast licenses.53  
Members of Congress have also used their leverage as regulators against broadcasters.54  
In other cases, the Commission may feel pressure from the bottom up, as the government 
uses its resources to foment complaints against disfavored media entities.  The Kennedy 
administration employed this sort of strategy to generate the complaints that led to the 
Supreme Court’s Red Lion decision.55  The administration used a publicist to monitor 
right-wing radio broadcasts and encouraged progressive individuals and groups to 
demand reply time on stations whose broadcasts attacked them.56  Even absent external 
pressures, commissioners’ enforcement decisions may reflect their covert or unconscious 
ideological biases.57 
 Fairness doctrine opponents also criticized the FCC’s enforcement practices as 
dangerously ad hoc and inconsistent.58  They placed little faith in the Commission’s 
reliance on public complaints to trigger enforcement actions, because the enforcement 
process served not the needs or will of the public but the machinations of interest 
groups.59  “Broadcast viewer complaints,” scoffed one critic, “may be uninformed, self-
serving, publicity seeking, and an attempt to hinder, restrict, hamper and frustrate free 
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 See FRIENDLY, supra note 45, at 131-33; POWE, supra note 48, at 121-41; SIMMONS, supra note 42, at 
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 See ROWAN, supra note 46, at 43. 
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AMENDMENT? 179 (1989) (criticizing the “core belief among Fairness Doctrine supporters that each 
interest group owns a First Amendment right to the airwaves of every broadcaster”). 
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expression.”60  In general, opponents reasonably emphasized that, whatever the risks and 
benefits of regulation in ordinary settings, courts should take an especially risk-averse 
posture as to media regulation, where abuses could undermine First Amendment rights.  
Well-intentioned efforts to enhance public debate through regulation, one critic argued, 
“unwittingly may create a massive censorship system masquerading as marketplace 
reform.”61 
 
 B. Whose Autonomy Does Substantive Regulation Constrain? 
  1. Thesis: Owners and Advertisers  
A recurring theme in arguments for substantive media regulation – as in 
arguments for most types of government regulation – is that the public needs the 
government to exercise power as a counterweight to wealthy and powerful private 
interests, in this case corporate media owners and advertisers.  All news organizations 
sustain tension between two groups of decision makers: owners and publishers, who 
primarily focus on making money; and editors and reporters, who primarily focus on 
doing good journalism.62  The two groups and their goals may coincide, but their tension 
is strong enough to require any analysis of substantive media regulation to identify which 
group’s autonomy the regulations constrain.  As Lee Bollinger has noted, the Red Lion 
decision,63 in validating the fairness doctrine, never refers to “the press” or “journalists” 
but only to “licensees” and “monopolies.”64  By characterizing the burdens of the 
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 Joseph L. Brechner, A Statement on the “Fairness Doctrine,” in KITTROSS & HARWOOD, supra note 57, 
at 143, 144. 
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 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 56. 
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 See James C. Thomson, Jr., Journalistic Ethics: Some Probings by a Media Keeper, in BERNARD RUBIN 
ED., QUESTIONING MEDIA ETHICS 40, 45 (1978). 
63
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
64
 See BOLLINGER, supra note 42, at 72-73. 
 17 
doctrine as falling primarily on the narrow, socially empowered class of owners and 
publishers, the doctrine’s supporters offered a natural complement to their contention that 
the doctrine broadly benefited the political community as a whole.65 
The idea that mass media owners and publishers represent a potentially dangerous 
concentration of money and power plays a central role in Professor Barron’s case for 
access rights.66  “The media owners and managers,” he declares, “. . . read freedom of the 
press as an immunity from accountability and any kind of legal responsibility.”67  
Emphasis on media owners as the natural target of fairness regulations inheres in the 
familiar justification of such regulations as incidents of broadcast licensure.68  
Subsequent defenders of substantive media regulation rooted the argument in a broader 
account of social power dynamics.  Dean Bollinger maintained that “the real concern is 
with power – that is, the ability to command an audience more or less exclusively – and . 
. . this concern is undiminished by the means by which such power is achieved.”69  The 
concern with power extended to dynamics within news organizations.  “The ways 
journalists report and edit are shaped by the relations of power and by the institutional 
priorities within the organizations that employ them.”70  Supporters of substantive 
regulation contended that media owners’ overriding emphasis on maximizing profit tends 
                                                 
65
 See Rainey, supra note 32, at 345 (“[T]he broadcaster’s duty regarding public affairs broadcasting is as 
extensive as the public’s collective right to be informed and to receive competing perspectives regarding 
public issues.”). 
66
 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 15, at 507 (calling for assessment of media regulation “against a 
background of economic combinations continuously concentrating the ownership of the media”); Barron, 
New Right, supra note 15, at 1643 (objecting, in context of industrial mass media, to “the view that 
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supra note 32, at 111-12 (endorsing regulation of the “small group which owns and operates the mass 
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67
 BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 4-5; see also Barron, Access Today, supra note 16, at 2 ( “Global 
media conglomerates have vast communicating power, and the rest of us have very little.”). 
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 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
69
 BOLLINGER, supra note 42, at 138. 
70
 JEREMY IGGERS, GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS: JOURNALISM ETHICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16 (1998). 
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to create a media culture that merely focuses on the audience’s market preferences while 
ignoring the people’s interest in sustaining and advancing democratic self-government.71  
They portrayed the fairness doctrine as elevating the interests of the people and the 
democratic system over media owners’ desire to accumulate wealth and power. 
Media advertisers constitute a second locus of financial control over mass media 
content for whose excessive power advocates of substantive media regulation viewed the 
fairness doctrine as a remedy.  The mass media depend so heavily on advertisers for their 
economic survival that advertisers can exert decisive influence over programming 
content, and particularly over the audience preferences the media themselves promote.72  
This influence is especially pernicious because both media outlets and advertisers try to 
avoid revealing it to the audience.73  In addition to advertising, large corporations can 
further influence media content by using their resources to package and deliver 
information.74  The fairness doctrine broadly countered advertisers’ power by subjecting 
broadcasters to countervailing public obligations.  The doctrine played an especially 
prominent role in curbing the influence of the dominant advertiser of the 1960s.  A few 
years after the Surgeon General declared that smoking tobacco products posed dire health 
risks, the FCC sustained a complaint that broadcast cigarette advertising impermissibly 
presented only one side of an issue of public importance – the issue of smoking’s social 
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 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 99-100 (2002) (hereinafter BAKER, 
MARKETS); Ferris and Kirkland, supra note 29, at 613 (characterizing fairness doctrine as “prevent[ing] a 
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desirability.75  Given the tobacco industry’s unparalleled contribution to broadcasters’ 
advertising revenues and broadcasters’ attendant complicity in keeping the public 
ignorant about tobacco’s health risks,76 the tobacco case represents the fairness doctrine’s 
greatest success in curbing advertisers’ control over media content. 
Some supporters of substantive media regulation have acknowledged that 
regulation can impact editorial discretion and justified that impact in the name of 
democratic discourse.  Barron has never shied away from questioning the nature and 
scope of editors’ prerogatives.77  In the end, however, even these arguments reflect an 
underlying antipathy toward owners and publishers.  Claims of editorial autonomy may 
amount to “the assertion of a property right in the guise of a free speech right.”78  If the 
First Amendment embodies an overarching value of robust and participatory democratic 
discourse, then no actor’s prerogatives automatically warrant protection.  Editorial 
autonomy deserves protection to the extent, and only to the extent, that it serves society’s 
best understanding of the aims of democratic discourse.79  Any attempt to treat editorial 
autonomy as a trump in the system of free expression devolves, on this view, to nothing 
more than a fabrication of entitlement that ultimately rests on power rather than right. 
  2. Antithesis: Editors and Reporters 
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 Opponents of substantive media regulation, like supporters, tell a story about who 
bears substantive regulation’s burdens that complements their account of who enjoys 
regulation’s benefits.  In the opponents’ narrative, the fairness doctrine’s narrow benefits 
do not operate as a check on rapacious capitalists80 but rather as an “invasion of the 
editor’s first amendment interests.”81  The National Association of Broadcasters, 
challenging the fairness doctrine in the late 1960s, made a strategic effort to push 
professional journalists into the foreground and “fat cats” into the background.82  The 
Supreme Court accepted this narrative of editorial autonomy in denying political 
advertisers’ demand that the FCC compel the CBS network to sell them air time: “For 
better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of 
material.”83  Abuse of this editorial function had “no acceptable remedy other than a 
spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility – and civility – on the part of those who 
exercise the guaranteed freedom of expression.”84  Regulatory skeptics portrayed editors’ 
decisions about which ideas to publish as serving a valuable democratic role that 
regulations like the fairness doctrine stifle.85  Undercutting the fairness doctrine with this 
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 This discussion leaves aside the libertarian First Amendment dogma that owners’ autonomy to decide 
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widely appealing vision of editors as sentries of democracy helped to shift the debate 
from the terrain of commerce, which our legal system routinely subordinates to 
conceptions of the public interest,86 to the domain of individual creative decisions, which 
exemplify the conscientious space protected by the First Amendment.87 
 Opponents of substantive regulation frequently pointed out that journalists operate 
under ethical standards that encourage them to present a range of viewpoints on 
important issues.88  Throughout the 20th Century, news organizations embraced a model 
of objective, professional journalism, an economically driven departure from the 
predominantly partisan press of the 19th Century.89  Modern journalists’ sense of 
professionalism reflects a native propensity for critical thought and gives rise to a “First 
Amendment syndrome,” which promotes a sense of professional responsibility and public 
service in editors and reporters even as it inspires them to safeguard their autonomy.90  In 
addition, critics of regulation argued that television newspeople see a particular need to 
present opposing viewpoints in order to engage viewers.91  Journalists’ professional 
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sensibility, opponents of regulation insisted, suffices to make reporters and their editors 
responsible and responsive to the public’s need for information.  Thus, the fairness 
doctrine countermanded not merely editorial autonomy but responsible journalistic 
discretion.  Critics of substantive regulation – especially current or former journalists – 
frequently endorsed the goal of presenting a range of perspectives on important issues, 
but they condemned regulators for not simply trusting journalists to achieve that goal.92 
 Regulatory opponents also sought to turn concerns about media owners’ 
concentrated power93 against supporters.  If the media fail to present diverse perspectives 
because too few entities own the media, then the government can implement a 
straightforward regulatory response: impose limits on the structures of media ownership 
rather than the selection of content.  Thus, some fairness doctrine opponents advanced 
structural regulation as a method of encouraging the mass media to present a diverse 
range of perspectives without limiting editorial autonomy and inhibiting frank 
discourse.94  This argument tracks the most common understanding of First Amendment 
doctrine, which generally does not treat structural media regulations as limiting speech.95  
Some commentators who cautiously sympathized with substantive regulation echoed this 
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preference for structural regulation.96  Another alternative more palatable to some 
cautious supporters was regulation by subsidy, such as former FCC chief counsel Henry 
Geller’s proposal to replace the entire broadcast licensure architecture with a spectrum 
fee that the government could use to finance public broadcasting programs.97 
 
 
C. How Does Substantive Regulation Seek to Alter the Prevailing Media 
Landscape? 
 
  1. Thesis: Incremental Improvement of Democratic Discourse 
 Supporters of substantive media regulation defended the fairness doctrine as a 
flawed but useful tool for deepening the content and broadening the participatory 
character of democratic debate.98  Supporters have rarely if ever characterized substantive 
regulation as a miracle cure for every democratic deficit of the mass media.  What they 
have claimed is that rules like the fairness doctrine make a positive contribution to 
democratic discourse by increasing the media’s presentation of diverse viewpoints on 
important public issues.  “[L]egal reforms,” wrote Cass Sunstein, “should not be expected 
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to bring about a Madisonian utopia.  But they could help.”99  The doctrine’s defenders 
recognized the inherent challenge of defining standards for sufficient coverage of 
important public issues and presentation of opposing viewpoints.  They also struggled 
with the desirability and conceptual integrity of the Supreme Court’s eventual restriction 
of substantive regulation to the broadcast media.  They maintained, however, that even 
the FCC’s imperfect efforts to define substantive standards for a limited range of media 
outlets opened substantial channels of mass communication to more voices and increased 
the aggregate breadth and depth of information about public issues available through the 
mass media. 
The fairness doctrine fostered a climate in which concerns about covering public 
issues and presenting opposing viewpoints figured prominently in virtually every 
discussion about the nature and societal role of the mass media.  Supporters of 
substantive regulation expressed frustration about the FCC’s failure to define the 
doctrine’s substantive requirements precisely.100  They frequently acknowledged, and 
often lamented, the Commission’s sporadic and halting enforcement of the doctrine.101  
On only one occasion did the Commission invoke the doctrine’s first requirement – the 
obligation to cover issues of public importance – against a broadcaster that had ignored a 
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major public issue.102  In the vast majority of cases that raised the doctrine’s second 
requirement – the obligation to provide a reasonable opportunity for the expression of 
opposing viewpoints – the Commission took no action.  The Commission in practice 
deferred strongly to broadcasters’ own determinations about how best to satisfy the 
doctrine’s mandates.103  Supporters maintained, however, that limiting enforcement to the 
most egregious cases struck a scrupulous balance between the doctrine’s policy aims and 
broadcasters’ operational autonomy, while the possibility of enforcement served to focus 
the media on the importance of publicly beneficial programming.104 
 Professor Barron argued vigorously – all the way to the Supreme Court in Miami 
Herald v. Tornillo105 – that newspapers could be subject to fairness-type regulations 
under the same logic the Court in Red Lion106 had applied to broadcasters.107  Once the 
Court rejected that position, however, distinctions between print and broadcasting 
became prominent in defenses of the fairness doctrine.  First, supporters contended, the 
broadcast medium lent itself to regulation in ways that print did not, whether because of 
the Red Lion rationale that the broadcast airwaves were a scarce resource108 or, more 
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persuasively, because broadcasting had always been subject to government licensing, and 
the government had always treated the broadcast license as a public trust.109  Second, 
broadcasting operated materially differently from print, whether because broadcasters 
were a lower grade of media professional110 or, more persuasively, because broadcasting 
represented a revolutionary technological advance whose unprecedented importance for 
public discourse compelled public oversight.111  To these technical distinctions between 
the print and broadcast media, Dean Bollinger added an ingenious substantive defense of 
their differential exposure to regulation.  In his view, the inherent complexity of mass 
communication counseled against undue confidence in either the market or regulation.  
The wisest course, then, was to split the baby: let one medium – print – operate free from 
regulation, while making the other – broadcasting – subject to some measure of 
regulation.112  Whatever disadvantages experience might reveal in either approach would 
remain absent from the other, and our system ultimately could maximize the advantages 
of either or both approaches.113 
  2. Antithesis: Impossible Balance with Incoherent Scope  
 Opponents of substantive regulation portrayed the goals of the fairness doctrine in 
more comprehensive, utopian terms than its supporters.  In a flourish perhaps 
unwarranted by the FCC’s cautious and incremental administration of the doctrine but 
                                                 
109
 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
110
 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 33, at 86-87 (generically criticizing commercial radio as undeserving 
of First Amendment protection). 
111
 See, e.g., Ferris and Kirkland, supra note 29, at 622 (maintaining that “the crucial importance of 
broadcasting in our national dialogue places the fairness rules beyond constitutional challenge”) (footnote 
omitted). 
112
 See Lee Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of 
the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
113
 One might reject Bollinger’s “partial regulation” strategy based on Martin Redish’s assertion that 
“surely a solution so intellectually bankrupt as this must be rejected.”  MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: 
SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 186 (2001).  To do so however, one would 
have to augment Redish’s invective with reasoning. 
 27 
reflecting the doctrine’s sweeping language, critics berated the doctrine as a doomed 
effort to impose a perfect state of fairness and balance on the broadcast media.  “The 
Fairness Doctrine,” asserted Thomas Krattenmaker and Scot Powe, “cannot be too hot, 
too big, or too hard.  Nor can it be too cold, too small, or too soft.  It must be just 
right.”114  At the same time, opponents derided the doctrine’s limitation to broadcasting 
as theoretically indefensible and practically underinclusive.  Objections to the fairness 
doctrine in operation repeatedly stressed three distinct problems.   
First, opponents branded the fairness doctrine analytically unsound and thus 
inherently unenforceable.  By its terms the doctrine required several necessarily 
subjective determinations.  What is a “controversial issue of public importance”?  How 
should regulators determine when a media entity has, in fact, raised such an issue?  What 
“sides” does a given issue present?  When has a broadcaster afforded a “reasonable 
opportunity” for the presentation of opposing viewpoints?  What changes in circumstance 
effectively obviate fairness complaints?  What presentation of controversial issues, in the 
end, counts as “fair”?  Opponents of the fairness doctrine portrayed the conceptual 
difficulty of these questions as a challenge that the FCC was unable or unwilling to 
meet.115  Even more sympathetic commentators acknowledged that “[o]ne man’s fairness 
may be another man’s bias.”116  Opponents called attention to the FCC’s weak 
enforcement of the doctrine, which buttressed their charge that the FCC lacked a 
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sufficient hold on the doctrine’s requirements to be able to administer it.117  Ultimately, in 
critics’ view, the doctrine’s practical failings reflected the underlying futility of what they 
portrayed as an effort to enforce a norm of perfect objectivity and balance.118 
Second, opponents charged that the fairness doctrine chilled discussion of 
controversial issues.  Even critics sympathetic with the goal of broadening public debate 
routinely deny the doctrine’s value based on what Ed Baker calls its “predictable 
deterrence” of reporting on political controversies.119  Because the FCC in practice 
almost never enforced the fairness doctrine’s first requirement – that broadcasters cover 
issues of public importance120 – avoidance of controversial issues gave broadcasters a 
way to avoid the aspect of the doctrine that the FCC did enforce: the balance 
requirement.121  A study by the antiregulation Cato Institute provided some support for 
this hypothesis as to radio, finding that the percentage of AM radio stations with news 
and/or talk formats increased dramatically after the fairness doctrine’s repeal.122  Critics 
also blamed the fairness doctrine for broadcasters’ refusals, illustrated in CBS v. 
Democratic National Committee,123 to sell advertising time for controversial political 
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messages.124  Some opponents of substantive regulation took particular issue with what 
they saw as the fairness doctrine’s inappropriate and unwise choice of balanced 
presentations by the mass media over a “partisan gadfly” vision of the press, under which 
different editors can voice their divergent opinions and let the people sort them out.125 
Third, opponents emphasized the weakness of the conceptual basis that, in their 
portrayal, formed the only legal justification for the Fairness Doctrine: the Red Lion 
Court’s theory of broadcast scarcity.126  Opponents emphasized two distinct, serious 
problems with the scarcity rationale.  First, the broadcast airwaves were never any scarcer 
than any other resource required for mass communication, such as ink or paper.127  Thus, 
at most, the scarcity rationale actually served as a flimsy excuse for government 
management and licensing of the public airwaves.128  Second, even if the scarcity 
rationale accurately described broadcasting, new technology was quickly rendering the 
broadcast technological model obsolete.129  The advent of cable television, on this 
account, seriously undermined the scarcity rationale, and the rise of the Internet rendered 
it laughable.  Without scarcity, the fairness doctrine’s limitation to broadcasting could not 
stand, and without that limitation, the doctrine lacked any foothold in First Amendment 
doctrine.  Opponents of substantive regulation also attacked the practical effects of 
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limiting the fairness doctrine to broadcasting.  Some insisted that the media’s multiplicity 
of information sources rendered incoherent any assessment of “fairness” within only a 
single medium.130  Others argued that broadcasting exerted insufficient influence on 
public opinion for a broadcast-only regulatory scheme to do much good.131 
 
II. SYNTHESIS AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
 Supporters of substantive media regulation made a substantial case for the 
fairness doctrine’s broad and important benefits, narrow and appropriate burdens, and 
utility for the media landscape.  Opponents, however, raised serious questions in each of 
those three dimensions, based on undeniably valid priorities: preventing political 
manipulation of communications regulation, safeguarding the democratically valuable 
functions of journalists, and avoiding futile and counterproductive government action in a 
critical expressive arena.  This part offers a tentative set of suggestions for how our 
governing institutions might approach the challenge of reviving substantive media 
regulation in order to advance the values the fairness doctrine’s supporters advanced 
while avoiding the traps the doctrine’s opponents feared.  These suggestions are 
necessarily general and preliminary; any of them might prove inadequate or unworkable.  
In particular, navigating the third dimension, the nature of substantive regulation’s 
alteration of the media landscape, presents exceptional challenges in the digital age.  My 
modest goal is to map, with guidance from the informative disagreements detailed in Part 
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I, the sort of path that any effort to revive substantive media regulation would need to cut 
through the tangled thicket of communications policy and constitutional law. 
 
 A. Dividing Regulatory Authority to Advance the Public Interest 
Supporters of substantive media regulation made a credible case that the fairness 
doctrine served a robust, meaningful account of the public interest in effective democratic 
debate.  Opponents countered with the insight that government media policies do not 
spring from any perfect democratic ideal, in support of which they cited some disturbing 
political manipulations of the fairness doctrine.  I have elsewhere expressed skepticism 
about the elected branches’ motivation to promote inclusiveness of voices and diversity 
of information in public discourse.132  That skepticism, however, provides no reason to 
abandon the effort.  To the extent critics of substantive regulation deny government’s 
capacity to regulate in the public interest,133 they enable nongovernmental constraints on 
public discourse to operate unchecked.  Government offers a unique source of what 
Owen Fiss calls “countervailing power” to push the public interest against the tide of 
market forces.134  Assuming the elected branches could find the political will to renew the 
fairness doctrine, they would need to make sure its enactment and enforcement advanced 
the people’s interest in inclusive, informative public debate and not the self-interests of 
government officials or their patrons.  After all, the government’s institutional resources 
and the patriotic allegiance it inspires place state power alongside economic power as 
objects of the fairness doctrine’s concern about keeping the media honest. 
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The most straightforward way to ensure regulation in the public interest is through 
a robust dynamic of interbranch checking and cooperation.  The FCC’s status as an 
independent agency provides substantial insulation against political abuse.135  In the 
context of substantive media regulation, however, the courts and Congress have natural 
and important roles to play in shaping and supervising the FCC’s necessary leading role 
in day-to-day enforcement.  Unfortunately, neither institution pulled its weight under the 
original fairness doctrine.  Congress set forth, at most, only the most general initial 
requirement for broadcasters to serve the public interest and added virtually nothing over 
the next four decades, to the extent that courts and commentators argued inconclusively 
about whether Congress even had codified the doctrine.136  The courts failed even more 
egregiously.  Professor Barron, in his early critiques of the fairness doctrine, pointedly 
called for judges to take an active role in administering substantive media regulation.137  
The Supreme Court in Red Lion flirted with providing an affirmative First Amendment 
basis for the fairness doctrine,138 but the Justices merely affirmed the FCC’s authority to 
enforce substantive media regulations.139  That deferential strategy reached its apotheosis 
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in the dyad of CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,140 which rejected a positive 
First Amendment claim for media access, and CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission,141 which rejected a First Amendment challenge to Congress’ mandate that 
the broadcasters sell air time to political candidates.142  The D.C. Circuit, with no 
authoritative constitutional direction from the Supreme Court, tended toward 
inconclusive decisions about the FCC’s enforcement of the doctrine.143 
A renewal of the fairness doctrine, to have any chance for success, would require 
Congress to lay out a well-informed and reasonably precise statutory framework and to 
examine periodically the FCC’s enforcement practices.  It would also require courts to 
provide meaningful guidance about the nature and extent of the substantive obligations 
the First Amendment allowed or required the government to place on regulated media, 
and to render decisive judgments about the statutory and constitutional propriety of the 
FCC’s actions in important cases.  Greater interaction among the branches would render a 
renewed fairness doctrine both more potent and less vulnerable to abuse. 
Congress could never anticipate every complexity of a substantive regulatory 
regime, but lessons from the experience of the original fairness doctrine would allow it to 
forestall some problems.  Congress could dramatically advance over its prior 
performance by making legislative findings to support a new fairness doctrine.144  Based 
on those findings, Congress could legislate the outlines of the new regulatory regime, 
such as what quantity and type of public issue programming the doctrine would require 
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regulated media to present, what sort of presentation would constitute sufficient debate 
among differing perspectives, and whether enforcement should occur on an instance-by-
instance or more periodic, cumulative basis.145  Going forward, Congress could hold 
periodic hearings to evaluate specific enforcement issues and to assess more generally the 
doctrine’s success in achieving its goals.  Beyond these foundational elements, Congress 
could diminish the threat of government abuse by implementing specific safeguards to 
prevent the actual or attempted political hijackings emphasized by regulatory critics.146  
The most straightforward way to check that threat would be to prohibit any government 
official or politically responsible employee from filing a fairness doctrine complaint or 
causing a complaint to be filed.147 
The Supreme Court ideally would contribute to any renewed regime of 
substantive media regulation an affirmative First Amendment jurisprudence of expressive 
access.148  In the likely event, however, that the Court lacked the appetite for imposing 
First Amendment obligations on government regulators, it could clarify the First 
Amendment principles that allowed the government to impose substantive media 
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regulations.  Under those principles, and pursuant to the statutory foundation laid by 
Congress, federal courts could proceed to review particular instances of the FCC’s 
enforcement, and nonenforcement, of the renewed fairness doctrine.  The judicial branch 
could improve on its performance under the original fairness doctrine by working to 
ensure that the Commission honored its obligation to enforce the renewed doctrine’s 
substantive mandates.  The D.C. Circuit’s strong performance in the WLBT case under 
the original fairness doctrine149 provides a rare but exemplary model.  At the same time, 
the courts would police the new regulatory regime by invoking traditional First 
Amendment rules against government abuses and encroachments on journalists’ 
democratically valuable content decisions. 
   In addition to investing fairness rules with institutional safeguards, a new regime 
of substantive media regulation could limit the scope of possible regulatory abuses by 
leaving the personal attack rule buried.150  In this regard I find myself uncomfortably at 
odds with Professor Barron’s forceful defense of access for the subjects of media 
assaults.151  In my view, however, the personal attack rule did far less than the fairness 
doctrine to advance the goals of inclusive participation and informational diversity that 
lie at the heart of Barron’s case for access rights.  The personal attack rule did bring 
different participants into public debate, and those participants added information that 
broadcasters otherwise probably would not have aired.  From the standpoint of access, 
however, the personal attack rule offered a platform only to figures of sufficient 
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prominence to have inspired attacks in the first instance.  Moreover, the rule addressed 
only those prominent figures’ narrow, parochial interests in preserving their own 
reputations, rather than any more broadly defined goal of public information.  The 
personal attack rule did provide a check against a species of one-sided media 
presentation, but the fairness doctrine empowered every member of the media audience 
to challenge any sort of one-sided presentation before the FCC and, if necessary, in 
court.152  Disavowing the personal attack rule would help to clear the way for a renewed 
fairness doctrine to deepen and diversify public debate. 
 
 B. Protecting Editorial Autonomy from Economic Power 
 As to the second dimension of dispute over substantive media regulation – whom 
does regulation constrain? – the relationship between journalists and the media industry 
has changed decisively since the days of the original fairness doctrine.  Opponents of 
regulation in that era built a plausible case that the doctrine constrained editors and 
journalists rather than media owners and advertisers and thus undermined the core 
protections of the Free Press Clause.  If nothing else, many journalists’ opposition to 
regulation substantiated the claim that the doctrine compromised their autonomy rather 
than merely forcing media corporations to set aside their profit fixations and self-
interested perspectives.  In addition, opponents credibly called attention to norms of 
journalistic ethics.153  Although their argument overstated the simplicity of journalistic 
independence, which requires budgetary security and diversity in the backgrounds of 
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working journalists in addition to ethical canons,154 the widespread journalistic 
commitment to balanced coverage of public issues rendered the fairness doctrine’s 
mandates at least theoretically extraneous.  Two considerations, however, undermine any 
present admonition that we should trust the press to police itself. 
 First, legal regulations and professional ethics codes necessarily do different 
jobs.155  For better or worse, journalistic ethical norms do little to effectuate the policy 
goals of the fairness doctrine.  Unlike professions such as medicine and law, journalism 
lacks an overarching code of ethics.156  Professional associations such as the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors and the Society of Professional Journalists promulgate 
ethics codes,157 but journalists need not belong to those organizations, and membership 
does not bind them to observe the associations’ ethical precepts.  Journalists generally 
must obey only the particular ethical canons of the media firms that employ them.  
Unfortunately, many news organizations “cannot maintain or even define their ethical 
standards.”158 News organizations that do maintain ethical codes generally emphasize 
what is good for business, with particular focus on their own prerogatives, rather than the 
public value of information.159  That emphasis requires maintaining credibility with 
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audiences,160 but news, by definition, is what audiences do not already know.  Thus, news 
organizations can maintain credibility while ignoring important public issues and 
slighting significant points of view.  The most rigorous news organizations maintain 
ethical rules that require avoiding actual or apparent conflicts of interest, reporting 
accurately, and making efforts to avoid ideological bias and to present different points of 
view.161  Those directives resonate with the goals of the fairness doctrine, but they neither 
reflect the broad democratic imperative of inclusive and informative public discourse nor 
provide an extrinsic check on news organizations’ biases or failures to present vigorous 
debate on public issues.162   
Second, in the two decades since the fairness doctrine’s demise, the economic 
pressures against which the doctrine’s supporters directed their efforts have corroded 
journalistic autonomy and integrity as severely as any regulation ever could.  Professor 
Barron in 1967 lamented the increasing consolidation of ownership in the mass media.163  
In the ensuing four decades, the problem has grown steadily worse.164  Robert 
McChesney identifies as the most important structural features of the present media 
landscape concentration – the consolidation of media ownership in a few hands – and 
conglomeration – the diversification of media corporations’ holdings to include different 
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sorts of media organs.165  Five enormous corporations now own most of the media outlets 
in the United States, creating an unprecedented degree of ownership concentration.166  
The federal government has enabled this concentration by such deregulatory measures as 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which allowed three firms to seize control of over 
half the radio advertising revenue in each of the fifty largest U.S. radio markets.167  In the 
newspaper field, the past two decades have accelerated a rush toward diminished 
competition, to the point where the vast majority of daily newspapers enjoy monopolies 
in their local markets168 and six major chains dominate the industry.169  In contrast to a 
regime of ownership by wealthy individuals or smaller companies, the “big five” media 
firms replicate one another’s essential characteristics, notably a political agenda well to 
the right of the public mean and the determination to advance that agenda through their 
media properties.170  
 Under these conditions, “[t]he walls that once separated the culture of the 
newsroom from the business culture of the surrounding corporation are being swept 
away.”171  Intense economic pressures in the present media climate have led news 
organizations, once maintained by media firms as prestigious, publicly beneficial loss 
leaders, to subordinate professional norms and scruples to the interests of shareholders 
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and advertisers.172  The mass media’s burgeoning obsession with making money and 
pleasing advertisers has crowded out the sense of obligation, prominent in our media 
culture throughout the 20th Century, to serve the public by devoting substantial resources 
to vigorous, reliable journalism.173  Reporting on issues of public concern tends to bring 
in less revenue than alternative forms of content.174  Accordingly, media corporations 
have cut costs by firing reporters and reducing the time and space devoted to news 
coverage.175  “Our corporate superiors,” laments former Los Angeles Times editor John 
Carroll, “regard our beliefs [in public service] as quaint, wasteful and increasingly 
tiresome.”176  Increased consolidation of ownership means that journalists who face 
pressure from ownership to compromise their standards cannot even jump to competing 
news organizations.177  The FCC has made matters worse by easing its rules for how 
broadcasters can satisfy the obligation, still nominally a condition of licensure, to provide 
public service programming.178 
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Supporters of substantive media regulation might claim that these dire 
circumstances entirely obviated the second dimension of disagreement about the fairness 
doctrine.  A renewed doctrine necessarily would constrain economic power rather than 
editorial autonomy, because economic power already constrains editorial autonomy.  
Whatever force journalistic ethical standards retain only reinforces this claim.  If 
professionalism obligates journalists to do the right thing, then any failure by journalists 
to do the right thing represents either a straightforward professional lapse or meddling by 
owners and publishers.  In either case, a renewed fairness doctrine would simply 
supplement journalistic standards.179  Such a blanket justification, however, proves too 
much.  As discussed above, fairness regulations cannot and do not perform the same 
function as journalistic ethical canons.180  Moreover, to treat the working relationship 
between owners and publishers, on one hand, and editors and reporters, on the other, as a 
fait accompli – even in this age of consolidation and commercialism – oversimplifies a 
complex dynamic.  Finally, for the government to supplant professional bodies’ 
promulgation and enforcement of journalistic ethics would centralize an important 
element of public discourse in the hands of a powerful, interested overlord, contrary to 
substantive media regulation’s prime directive of creating more inclusive and informative 
democratic debate.  Turning the insight that fairness rules can advance rather than impede 
journalistic integrity into workable and constructive policy will require creative thinking. 
Congress and the FCC should design any renewed fairness doctrine to protect the 
discretion of editors and reporters against the economic pressures imposed by media 
owners and advertisers.  This approach would precisely tailor the doctrine’s mandate to 
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its most compelling justification: preventing financially powerful interests’ co-opting of 
journalists’ professional judgment.  The doctrine’s substantive requirements could 
explicitly target failures of coverage and diversity that resulted from economic 
pressures.181  The Commission, in adjudicating fairness complaints, could focus its 
inquiry on whether owners or advertisers caused a media outlet to subvert its public 
interest obligations.  Of course, such a “due process of journalism” approach would 
present the same practical challenges as any similar oversight of institutional 
interactions.182  At the same time, such a regulatory regime would strengthen determined 
editors’ hands against owners’ and advertisers’ interference, and a pattern or practice of 
such interference would become difficult to conceal.  A regulatory focus on whether 
media owners or advertisers interfered with editorial judgment would be novel and 
challenging, but not entirely unprecedented.  The Commission in the past has imposed 
restrictions and penalties on broadcast licensees who subordinated their public interest 
obligations to controlling entities’ judgments or interests.183   In addition, other western 
democracies have enacted or considered legal measures to protect journalistic and 
editorial autonomy against media owners’ interference.184 
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Opponents of substantive media regulation have argued forcefully for structural 
regulation as a sufficient alternative that obviates any need for government directives 
about media content.185  Certainly structural regulation forms a critical part of any 
strategy to achieve greater diversity of ideas in the mass media.  At least two 
considerations, however, counsel against exclusive reliance on structural rules.  First, the 
deregulatory era has treated structural regulation little more kindly than substantive 
regulation.186  The ongoing consolidation of media ownership187 reflects the lack of 
political will to impose or maintain effective structural regulations, and the present FCC 
appears committed to rolling back structural limits on media ownership.188  Perhaps 
structural regulation will flourish in the future while substantive regulation stagnates, but 
a prudent regulatory strategy for the present should pursue both avenues.  This same 
imperative counsels against limiting government regulatory initiatives to subsidy 
programs.189  Second, even a robust system of structural regulation may not accomplish 
all the goals that drive substantive regulation.  Even a properly competitive media market 
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will not deliver the full diet of robust public debate that democracy requires, because the 
market cannot accurately value the aspects of media performance that contribute to 
democratic engagement.190  In addition, the market itself imposes distinctive content 
pressures toward satisfying the desires of more affluent consumers and maximizing the 
ratio of revenue to cost.191  Accordingly, even if structural regulation succeeded in 
diversifying media ownership, we would still need substantive regulation to diversify 
media content. 
 
 C. Promoting Vigorous Political Debate in the Conventional Mass Media 
 The most difficult question for any effort to revive substantive media regulation is 
how a renewed fairness doctrine would aim to alter the prevailing media landscape.  
Supporters of the original fairness doctrine articulated a strong democratic basis for 
enriching the content of public debate and a strong sociological basis for pursuing that 
enrichment through regulation of mass media.  With remarkable consistency, however, 
their arguments tracked the contours of a media status quo that no longer prevails.  
Opponents, for their part, too frequently relied on libertarian platitudes that reduced 
liberty to the absence of regulation.  But they also posed three challenging questions to 
which the doctrine’s supporters never articulated fully satisfactory answers.  First, how 
can regulators effectively enforce rules that require concrete understandings of such 
elusive concepts as fairness, balance, and issues of public concern?  Second, how can 
substantive government regulation of the media promote, rather than inhibit, the free and 
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vigorous exchange of ideas?  Finally, how does the regulatory scheme justify the 
simultaneously inequitable and incomplete imposition of fairness obligations only on the 
broadcast media?  The first two questions implicate the policy mandate of a substantive 
regulatory regime; the third goes to the regime’s scope.  Any attempt to renew the 
fairness doctrine will need to address all three questions squarely and effectively. 
  1. Mandate: Coverage of Public Issues and Promotion of Debate 
 Both of the primary arguments that regulatory critics raised to attack the original 
fairness doctrine’s substantive mandates – that conceptual confusion precluded the 
doctrine’s meaningful enforcement192 and that the doctrine chilled controversial 
programming193 – suffer from serious logical deficiencies.  Everyone agrees that the 
doctrine presented formidable conceptual challenges and that the FCC failed to answer 
those challenges with sufficient certainty to sustain robust enforcement.  Conceptual 
challenges, however, do not inherently or inevitably foreclose regulation in this area any 
more than in any other complex field.194  At the same time, the Commission’s failure to 
maintain regulatory bite seriously undermines the assertion that the doctrine chilled 
controversial speech.195  Vague speech regulations can of course foment a climate of 
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fear,196 but a sustained pattern of weak enforcement reduces vagueness to an annoyance.  
Rigorous assessments of the fairness doctrine found the evidence that the doctrine chilled 
broadcasters limited and anecdotal.197  This dearth of evidence suggests that broadcasters’ 
claims of a chilling effect reflected some combination of irrational fear and rhetorical 
posturing.198  Even if the fairness doctrine did discourage some controversial 
programming, assessment of that effect must take into account the doctrine’s 
countervailing success in promoting public affairs programming and exposing the polity 
to a wide range of ideas.  Professor Barron has observed, for example, that the fairness 
doctrine inspired newspapers to enhance viewpoint diversity through innovations – such 
as op-ed pages, extensive letters to the editor, rigorous policies for retracting 
inaccuracies, and ombudsmen – that continue to enrich the medium.199  No one appears to 
assail those advances as the badges and incidents of censorship. 
The FCC’s repeal of the fairness doctrine allowed broadcasters to disregard the 
public interest in balanced presentation of important public issues.  The Cato Institute 
study that claims the doctrine’s demise breathed new life into news and talk radio200 
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deserves little credence, because it presumes without analysis that coincidence between 
the doctrine’s repeal and the growth of news and talk formats equals causation.201  Even 
if we accept the study’s causal hypothesis, however, it says not one word about whether 
the posited explosion in news and talk formats encouraged the multiplicity of 
perspectives on important issues that the fairness doctrine sought to generate.202  The 
Cato study asserts that the fairness doctrine impeded what it sought to foster – genuine 
democratic debate – but the study proves, at most, only that the doctrine impeded what it 
sought to combat – hermetic, hidebound agit-prop that crowds out opportunities for 
democratic debate.  At the same time, a renewed fairness doctrine would not smother the 
ideal of a partisan press.  Mass media, by their nature, do not take bold, partisan stands.  
Instead, they make broadly influential decisions about what information is newsworthy 
under some standard of – or at least pretense to – objectivity.203  The dominance of the 
partisan media ideal ended with the dawn of contemporary mass culture.  Today that 
ideal thrives at the cultural margins, in thousands of specialty journals, websites, cable 
channels, and individual broadcast programs – none of which any new substantive media 
regulation presumably would, or should, disturb.  
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Despite their weaknesses, the conceptual confusion and chilling effect objections 
to the fairness doctrine spotlight dangers that any revival of the doctrine should strive to 
neutralize.  The greater engagement by Congress and the courts that I have proposed 
would go some distance toward addressing these concerns.204  On a substantive level, a 
renewed fairness doctrine would need to serve goals ambitious enough to advance 
democratic debate in a meaningful way but modest enough to avoid both exceeding 
policymakers’ conceptual grasp and discouraging frank discourse.  The most promising 
approach, I believe, would be to combine strengthened enforcement of the original 
fairness doctrine’s first component – the coverage obligation – with a revised conception 
of its second component – the obligation to present varied perspectives – that focused less 
on achieving balance and more on promoting debate. 
The mass media’s performance since the fairness doctrine’s demise, spurred in 
part by the structural changes discussed above,205 demonstrates a widespread failure to 
present debate on controversial issues.206  The most glaring and important example in 
recent years was the media’s plunge down the Bush administration’s rabbit hole toward 
the Iraq War, greased by uncritical acceptance of government assertions and contempt for 
dissent.207  That embarrassment all too accurately represents the media’s conspicuous 
unwillingness or inability to inform and engage the public about government malfeasance 
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ranging from support for foreign despots208 to disregard for domestic poverty.209  At the 
local level, television news coverage has shifted its attention from matters of public 
deliberation to sensationalistic crime stories and entertainment features.210  In the 
newspaper field – which never labored under the fairness doctrine – advertisers’ hunger 
for affluent readers has led the dwindling population of urban papers to report less news 
about the cities they supposedly serve.211  Coverage of lifestyle and entertainment topics 
increasingly crowds out reporting of hard news, whether local or international.212  
Instances of courageous commentary or tenacious investigative reporting have become 
rare.  Many of these failings predate the fairness doctrine’s repeal – regulated 
broadcasters did no better job of forestalling our Vietnam fiasco than deregulated 
broadcasters have done with Iraq – but all of them have accelerated in the two decades 
since the doctrine’s demise.  
 A carefully conceived renewal of the fairness doctrine could substantially 
improve the mass media’s crucial contribution to democratic discourse.  First, any new 
regime of substantive media regulation should shut the controversy avoidance escape 
hatch by vigorously enforcing a requirement, along the lines of the original fairness 
doctrine’s first element, that regulated media cover important public issues.  Professor 
Barron, recognizing that the mass media were “using the free speech and free press 
guarantees to avoid opinions instead of acting as a sounding board for their 
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expression,”213 vigorously advocated using the fairness doctrine to place broadcasters 
under a greater affirmative obligation “to originate debate and seek out controversial 
issues for presentation on radio and television.”214  Numerous other commentators on the 
fairness doctrine similarly criticized the FCC’s refusal to enforce the coverage 
requirement.215   At the same time, the coverage requirement arguably embodied the 
doctrine’s most serious threat to editorial autonomy, because it imposed a free-standing 
obligation that did not turn on the broadcaster’s autonomous decision to raise an issue.216  
Under a revived fairness doctrine, Congress, the FCC, and reviewing courts would need 
to develop a coverage mandate that both allowed for vigorous enforcement and 
minimized the danger of government abuse.  Thoughtful reformers in the 1970s proposed 
that the FCC, rather than directing broadcasters to cover specified issues, should 
promulgate and enforce an aggregate airtime percentage requirement for public issue 
programming;217 include cultural and local affairs programming within the public interest 
mandate;218 and require broadcasters to consult with community leaders and ordinary 
viewers about which issues mattered to them and to document responsiveness to their 
concerns.219  These ideas provide a useful starting point for structuring a new coverage 
mandate.  Regulators would also need to adapt the coverage obligation to different sorts 
                                                 
213
 Barron, New Right, supra note 15, at 1646. 
214
 BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 151. 
215
 See FRIENDLY, supra note 45, at 221; SIMMONS, supra note 42, at 166-75 (assessing FCC’s failure to 
enforce fairness doctrine’s coverage requirement and proposing that FCC refocus fairness doctrine 
enforcement on coverage rather than balance requirement); Geller, supra note 32, at 303-04; Marks, supra 
note 32, at 992-93 (contending that First Amendment obligated FCC to enforce coverage requirement in 
order to prevent government from making broadcast licensing decisions based on licensees’ political 
views). 
216
 See ROWAN, supra note 46, at 98-99; SIMMONS, supra note 42, at 172-73; but see BAKER, MARKETS, 
supra note 71, at 204 (suggesting that media regulations are more onerous when triggered by initial 
decision to publish certain content); Marks, supra note 32, at 990-92 (suggesting that fairness doctrine’s 
coverage requirement, unlike its balance requirement, avoided problem of prior restraint).   
217
 See GELLER, supra note 32, at 61-64; SIMMONS, supra note 42, at 225-27. 
218
 See Marks, supra note 32, at 1002. 
219
 See SIMMONS, supra note 42, at 227-28. 
 51 
of mass media.  Existing requirements that cable systems carry community access 
channels offer one template for applying fairness-type rules to multichannel media 
outlets.220 
 As to the original fairness doctrine’s second element – opportunity for 
presentation of opposing viewpoints – Congress and the FCC could give a new regulatory 
scheme a better chance of doing more good by focusing less on achieving balance and 
more on presenting and fostering debate.  Commentators properly emphasize that 
important public issues have more than two sides.221  No media presentation – voluntary 
or mandatory, however well-conceived – could fully present the competing positions on 
any complex issue.  Critics also correctly warn that we cannot reasonably expect 
government, itself dominated by elites, to ameliorate professional journalism’s historic 
embrace of elite and mainstream perspectives.222  Indeed, even the most earnest 
regulatory pursuit of perfect balance or objectivity, aside from being futile, would 
reinforce professional journalism’s tendency to embrace official accounts of truth and 
bleach out dissension.223  Such a fetish for objectivity, at its worst, can provide cover for 
the very sort of partisan bias the fairness doctrine seeks to ameliorate.224  On the other 
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hand, an appropriate, ideologically neutral concern about conservative talk radio225 is not 
that it aggressively presents a point of view – to that extent, it is a democratic exemplar – 
but that it insulates its audience from any need or inclination to question received 
truths.226  The First Amendment guarantees the right to myopia of any ideology or belief 
system that declines to look outward.  It provides no such guarantee, however, for a 
dominant mass medium.  Our democratic system permits the government to structure the 
mass media landscape in ways that create at least some likelihood that people will 
encounter disagreements about public issues. 
A renewed fairness doctrine could require regulated media to present active 
debate between or among some number of competing perspectives – what Barron frames 
as “the existence of adequate opportunity for debate, for charge and countercharge.”227  
Such a requirement would not ensure that the mass media fully informed the public about 
the profusion of opinions from far left to far right.  At most, for example, it would require 
conservative talk radio to present some disputes between right and harder right, between 
social and economic conservatives, between libertarian and authoritarian conservatives.  
In requiring even that much, however, a new regime of substantive regulation would 
encourage critical thought and engaged discourse.  It would provide a model of debate 
and dissension that could open space in the public consciousness for farther reaching 
disagreements.228  This emphasis on the dynamic of debate, combined with the sort of 
coverage obligation discussed above, would also encourage a revival of investigative and 
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analytic journalism – socially beneficial practices that require the sorts of journalistic 
resources the mass media possess but that economic pressures have all but led them to 
abandon. 
Even if this recasting of the fairness doctrine’s mandate proved no more amenable 
to vigorous enforcement than the original fairness doctrine, reviving the doctrine could 
still bring significant benefits.  The original doctrine’s greatest contribution to democracy 
may well have been its success in focusing the mass media on their essential role in 
fostering informative and inclusive public discourse.229  Few commentators on either side 
of the regulatory debate during the 1960s and 1970s disputed the media’s public service 
obligations and responsibility to present varied perspectives on important public issues.  
Indeed, opponents of the fairness doctrine promoted the broadcast media’s willingness 
and capacity to serve those ideals without government regulation.230  Meanwhile, the 
print media substantially internalized the fairness doctrine’s norms without ever being 
subject to the doctrine’s mandates.231  The Red Lion decision, despite declining to anchor 
the fairness doctrine in a First Amendment mandate, expanded the free speech values 
extolled by journalists to encompass the doctrine’s regulatory aims.232   Today, in 
contrast, mass media entities frequently disdain any role in, let alone responsibility for, 
public discourse.233  The concern that substantive media regulation chills speech234 states 
a serious danger, but so does the concern that deregulation fosters media cynicism and 
selfishness.  The difference is that the latter effect has actually happened.  Even if a 
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renewed fairness doctrine failed to provide an enforceable mandate for coverage of public 
issues and promotion of public debate, its mere presence in the media landscape could be 
expected to encourage a more democratically vibrant mass media.  
  2. Scope: Conventional Mass Media 
 The limitation of the original fairness doctrine to broadcasting invested media 
regulation with a split personality.  Broadcasters labored under substantial regulatory 
obligations, while newspapers could go about their business unimpeded.  The public 
received only a partial benefit from fairness regulation, while the two sorts of media 
faced seemingly arbitrary differences in expressive freedom.  This state of affairs 
reflected a mélange of circumstances: the relative youth of the broadcast medium; 
government’s initial decision to license broadcasting and impose public interest 
obligations; and the Supreme Court’s decision to take editorial discretion and compelled 
speech concerns more seriously in the print setting than in the broadcast setting.  Dean 
Bollinger offered his “partial regulation” theory235 as a pragmatic accommodation of the 
Court’s seemingly inconsistent treatment of an old medium, print, and a new medium, 
broadcasting.236  He did not defend the differential treatment based on organic features of 
the two media; rather, he emphasized the benefits of diversity for its own sake. 
Today, the media landscape has changed in ways that may offer new avenues for 
implementing, and justifying, fairness regulations.  Organic features of the Internet 
provide a deeper justification for the differential treatment of media that Bollinger 
defended.  Cyberspace fosters what optimists celebrate as pluralism and pessimists 
lament as divisiveness.  The Web surfer enjoys an unprecedented and ever-increasing 
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opportunity to control her informational environment, piling on perspectives that 
reinforce her commitments and tastes while locking out those that do not.237  This 
pluralizing capacity has an upside and a downside.  On one hand, the Internet represents 
an apotheosis of self-direction in a world increasingly hostile to individuality.  On the 
other hand, it allows us to look and talk past one another to an unprecedented extent, 
leaving us ill-prepared for the engagement with opposing viewpoints that democratic 
self-government requires.238  Cass Sunstein has reacted to the dark side of this picture by 
proposing a set of Internet content controls that would, in effect, force people to confront 
unpopular ideas online.239  The Internet’s valuable democratizing and participatory 
attributes, however, make the notion of imposing such controls both implausible and 
undesirable.240 
 In contrast, regulating other media to complement the Internet could prove both 
feasible and beneficial.  Any revival of the fairness doctrine should take account of the 
Internet’s effects on public discourse and attempt to provide – in what I will call the 
conventional mass media – what the Internet does not.  A democracy-centered 
understanding of the First Amendment permits, perhaps even compels, regulatory efforts 
to engage the full political community in debate about matters of collective self-
government.  In contrast to the pluralistic communication the Internet facilitates, the 
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fairness doctrine embodies republican values of mediated public discourse and broadly 
shared experience.241  Where the untamed Internet provides radical consumer choice, 
conventional mass media, constrained by a renewed fairness doctrine, could provide a 
space where members of the political community stumbled over speakers and views they 
might otherwise choose to ignore.  A regulatory scheme aimed at ensuring that 
conventional mass media performed that function could serve as a holding action while 
our society studied and debated the question of how to sustain political engagement 
through public discourse in the event the Internet’s pluralizing capacity came to dominate 
the media landscape entirely.242 
What are conventional mass media?  The original fairness doctrine applied 
straightforwardly to television and radio broadcasters, but contemporary media structures 
– such as cable systems, which distribute packages of channels and enjoy market power 
within their territories – complicate legal analysis of media regulations.243   
“Conventional mass media” is a functional category.  “Mass” distinguishes those media 
enterprises that strive for broad-based appeal to maximize profit, rather than offering a 
distinctive content category to a particular audience.  The mass media, as a matter both of 
                                                 
241
 See BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 71, at 173 (emphasizing fairness doctrine’s republican character).  
Professor Baker, advocating a “complex democratic” framework that would balance pluralist and 
republican priorities in media policy, critiques Bollinger’s “partial regulation” approach on the ground that 
the unregulated print media advance pluralism less effectively than the regulated broadcast media advance 
republicanism.  See id. at 188.  The Internet appears to obviate that practical concern.  Baker’s more recent, 
more sweeping attack on the fairness doctrine as ideologically biased in favor of republican democracy, see 
BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 97, at 195-96, mistakenly evaluates the doctrine in a vacuum, without 
considering how it might provide a counterweight to government’s equally willful decision to promote 
pluralism by leaving media sectors that foster pluralism, such as the Internet, unregulated. 
242
 Such a process, of course, feeds into what should be an ongoing policy debate about which of the 
various democratic values that we want the media to advance feature excessively or insufficiently in the 
media landscape at any given time.  See BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 71, at 191. 
243
 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding 
requirement that cable systems carry local broadcast stations among their offerings); Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760-66 (1996) (plurality opinion) (rejecting statutory 
allowance for cable operators to exercise editorial control over certain programming content). 
 57 
self-definition and audience perception, “describe[e] the world ‘as it is.’”244  
“Conventional” does not only mean “traditional” or “ordinary.”  It also connotes a space 
for communal gathering and shared experience.  Thus, the term “conventional mass 
media” describes the media sector in which large enterprises’ desire for economic gain 
through generalized programming, including but not limited to news coverage, meets the 
mass audience’s desire for a stratum of broad cultural confluence.245  In today’s media 
landscape, the category includes, at a minimum, cable systems as well as television and 
radio networks, national news magazines, and daily newspapers.  The Internet falls into a 
different category.  In the aggregate the Web can be both “mass” and “conventional”; but 
at this point in its development, no single source or concerted assemblage of distinct 
online content either endeavors to unite and inform a mass audience or succeeds in doing 
so in the manner of a broadcast network or cable system.246 
Conventional mass media maintain a dominant position even in today’s 
information-rich media landscape.  Audiences continue to coalesce around familiar 
primary news sources.  A Gallup Poll conducted in December, 2006 reports that 69 
percent of Americans watch local television news at least several times a week, while 51 
percent watch national network news, half watch cable news, and 40 percent watch 
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public television news; in addition, 57 percent read a local newspaper at least several 
times a week.247  One third of the population uses Internet news sources, slightly more 
than listen to radio talk shows or NPR.248  Growth in Internet news usage appears to have 
slowed over the past two years, and while local newspapers and network television news 
continue to lose market share, the daily audience for local television news remains at the 
same level, 55 percent, as in 1995.249   The leading position of local broadcast news and 
newspapers indicates, in part, a pluralist taste for localism.  At the same time, local news 
viewers and readers choose to share a broad base of information with other members of 
their local communities.  Moreover, local news outlets increasingly draw content from 
national broadcast networks or wire services, a phenomenon that cuts against localism.  
More than the Internet, the factor that appears to be fraying conventional mass media’s 
republican connectivity is partisanship.  A 2004 study by the Pew Research Center found, 
to no one’s surprise, that many more Democrats than Republicans patronize – and trust – 
CNN and NPR, while the opposite dichotomy holds for Fox News and Rush 
Limbaugh.250 
 My conception of the conventional mass media creates a problem, from the 
standpoint of legal doctrine, because it necessarily includes print as well as audiovisual 
media.  Indeed, if we acknowledge the connotation in “conventional” of traditional or 
familiar, print emerges as a far more conventional medium than electronic transmission.  
Substantive regulation advocates of Professor Barron’s generation, however, would find 
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in this turn of the analysis not a problem but the closing of a logical circle.  The 
technological scarcity analysis of Red Lion251 never made much sense as a constitutional 
matter, and technological changes were diminishing its empirical force even as the ink 
dried on the Court’s opinion.252  The Court’s shift in tone from Red Lion to Miami 
Herald253 suggests the notion that newspaper editors, unlike broadcast news directors, 
exercise responsible professional judgment about what to publish.254  Absent that 
romantic, seemingly antiquated bias in favor of ink-stained fingers, we should feel 
equally comfortable applying fairness regulations to video channels and daily 
newspapers. 
 A better reason, however, supports the conclusion to which the romantic bias 
leads.  Newspapers and news magazines differ from broadcast stations in two important 
ways, corresponding with the two mandates of the original fairness doctrine, that 
combine to make the doctrine presumptively unnecessary in the print setting.  First, 
newspapers’ and news magazines’ defining function is to present news.  While 
newspapers devote the majority of their column inches to advertising and only a fraction 
of the remainder to news coverage,255 they still conceive of themselves, and register with 
readers, as news organs first and foremost.  In contrast, most television stations and many 
radio stations with news divisions devote most of their time to other sorts of 
programming.  Second, newspapers and news magazines developed strategies during the 
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original fairness doctrine’s epoch to encourage viewpoint balance.256  They still largely 
fail to offer a truly broad range of opinions,257 but they do routinely present active debate 
between competing ideas.  In contrast, the broadcast media present little commentary or 
debate about public affairs, let alone access for opposing viewpoints.258  One need not 
overvalue newspapers or disparage television to recognize that print news media’s 
ordinary practices tend to obviate the modest coverage and debate mandates that I have 
suggested should animate a revived fairness doctrine.259  Thus, my seemingly novel, 
functional analysis of the fairness doctrine’s proper scope leads back to television and 
radio as the proper subjects of any effort to revive the doctrine.260 
 None of this may matter.  Ellen Goodman has constructed a persuasive model of 
the “digital mediascape,” in which old conditions of content scarcity and audience 
passivity have given way to new conditions of content abundance and audience control.  
In this new world, Goodman argues, substantive media regulation is essentially futile, 
because it depends on the obsolete premise that audiences will consume the information 
that substantive regulation draws out.261  Goodman’s analysis provides a compelling 
justification for vigorously pursuing the subsidy policies that she believes will drive the 
next wave of effective democratic media policy.262  In my view, however, she overstates 
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the prevalence of the new model, and accordingly understates the continuing salience of 
the conventional mass media.263  Goodman’s focus on video media draws attention away 
from the prominent role that print and radio continue to play in shaping public 
discourse.264  She generally underestimates the continuing dominance of relatively few 
leading news sources.265  Moreover, while Goodman acknowledges the media echo 
effect, through which an idea’s entry into the media landscape can amplify audiences’ 
exposure to the idea through secondary reports in other media,266 I suspect she 
understates the extent to which conventional mass media “brand names” continue to 
provide an especially resonant echo.  Finally, Goodman’s grounds for rejecting 
substantive regulation may prove too much, because she does not make clear how even 
the subsidy policies she prefers – indeed, how any initiative, public or private – could 
salvage any sort of shared public discourse for the attention-deficient audience she 
portrays.267 
  
CONCLUSION 
 My own views about the wisdom of reviving substantive media regulation remain 
conflicted.  Unlike structural regulation and subsidies, substantive regulation, as 
embodied in the fairness doctrine, directly involved the government in evaluating the 
content of speech.  Even to the extent we can fairly minimize the speech interests at issue 
because the mass media are immense, profit-making institutions rather than individuals or 
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affinity groups, we must also acknowledge that our society depends on those institutions 
to help us fulfill an affirmative First Amendment vision of engaged, robust debate.  At 
the same time, substantive media regulation does not directly empower marginalized 
voices to express their viewpoints in the mass media, as a true regime of access rights 
would.  Moreover, the fairness doctrine’s history presents ample cause for concern – less 
about oppression, despite libertarian alarmists’ hyperventilation, than about 
administrative practicality.  The original doctrine simply did not work well enough.  Any 
effort to revive it would require more sophisticated understandings than the former 
regime generated about what issues regulated media must cover and what those media 
must do to satisfy our democratic need for robust debate.  Most problematic of all, the 
development of online communication threatens to undermine any effort to define a 
coherent scope for a new regime of substantive media regulation. 
 Three considerations, however, should motivate efforts to overcome the problems 
of substantive media regulation.  First, my analysis indicates that substantive media 
regulation has done significant good and little harm.  Second, the present generation’s 
apparent distaste for the idea of the fairness doctrine owes primarily to the fact of the 
doctrine’s demise, and that demise owed not to any documented suppression of speech or 
even conclusive regulatory failure but merely to ideological fashion.  The FCC, as one 
celebration of its shift reminds us, abolished the doctrine because official Washington 
was “riding a deregulatory wave,”268 flush with the conviction that markets could solve 
every problem.  That wave sought to sweep away the idea that powerful institutions owe 
responsibilities to ordinary people, the idea that lay at the heart of the fairness doctrine.  It 
is an idea well worth recuperating.  Finally, the fairness doctrine’s thoughtful defenders, 
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exemplified by Jerome Barron, got several critical points exactly right.  A healthy 
democracy requires broadly participatory and substantively diverse public discourse.  The 
mass media figure centrally in any hope of generating such a discourse.  A combination 
of institutional self-interest and, increasingly, an omnivorous profit motive deter the mass 
media from playing their essential constructive role.  Only government intervention can 
solve the problem.  The question those sound premises leave open is what form the 
intervention should take.  Legitimate concerns about substantive media regulation lead 
most media reformers to hope for some effective combination of structural regulations 
and subsidies.  But until one or both of those alternatives takes political flight, or until 
reflection forces us to concede that no benefits of substantive media regulation could 
exceed the costs of imposing it and of diverting effort from other reform strategies, the 
project of retooling and reviving the fairness doctrine should remain on our agenda. 
